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BOOK REVIEW 
CLEAN AIR ACT AND HIGH-SULFUR COAL 
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-
SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE 
ABOUT IT. By Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. 193. 
Reviewed by Linda G. Lockwood* 
The instability and expense of foreign oil, the risks of nuclear 
power, and the embryonic state of solar technology have made fur-
ther exploitation of the rich coal reserves within our national borders 
a necessary approach to meeting our energy needs. Coal is the domi-
nant fuel for generating electricity in the United States, and it is 
highly probable that the use of coal for this purpose will increase 
over the next half century. Unfortunately, coal is a dirty fuel. The 
smoke produced by coal combustion in electricity generating power 
plants is a major source of several air pollutants, such as sulfur ox-
ides and particulates. Therefore, it is understandable that the pollu-
tion control of newly constructed coal burners has emerged as one of 
the more pressing issues confronting the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). In its efforts to address this problem the EPA has 
imposed New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for reducing 
sulfur dioxide (S02) and particulate emissions from new coal-burning 
* Associate Professor, Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Mas-
sachusetts. Amherst. Massachusetts. B.S., M.A., and Ph.D. Columbia University. 
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power plants.1 To meet the prescribed emission standards, new 
plants are required to install very expensive technological gizmos 
called scrubbers which chemically remove a certain percentage of 
the sulfur from the flue gasses before they are released into the at-
mosphere. 
With the imminent reauthorization of the Clean Air Act, it would 
be hard to imagine a more timely book than Clean Coal/Dirty A ir: or 
How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Brlil-Out for 
High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About It, by 
Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler. 2 This provocative book 
is divided conceptually into two parts. The first is a case study which 
focuses upon the decade-long development of the New Source Per-
formance Standards (NSPS) for coal-burning power plants. The 
study analyzes the relationship of forced scrubbing to compliance 
with numerical ceiling standards for sulfur dioxide (S02) emissions, 
and discusses what these criteria have to do with the ultimate goal of 
cleaning the air as mandated by the Clean Air Act. The case study 
skillfully describes the bureaucratic struggle, the political manipula-
tion in Congress during the late seventies, and the impact of a 
"bizarre coalition"3 of environmentalists and dirty (high-sulfur) coal 
producers upon these central policy issues and the scrubber con-
troversy. The EPA's NSPS requirement that new plants scrub their 
stacks has proved to be very expensive and, as the authors docu-
ment, not very effective. The second half of the book philosophically 
analyzes the case study with the purpose of revealing instructional 
clues to suggest institutional reforms which would support better 
future policymaking. When viewed as an interrelated whole, the 
book provides a comprehensive and far-reaching analysis of the 
NSPS policy issue. 
Earth Day (April 22, 1970) was a gala, grass roots "happening," 
the effects of which will be studied for decades to come. The passions 
of the early environmental movement triggered a legal revolution 
whereby a well intentioned Congress, in attempting to move beyond 
the New Deal's sins of passivity, played a more aggressive role in en-
vironmental policymaking than ever before. The authors contend 
that Congress overreacted in some instances by developing ambi-
1. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580·624 (1979), codified in 40 C.F.R. § 60.43a (1979), is the revised NSPS 
decision, so called because it is a revision of the NSPS originally promulgated in 1971. 
2. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR How THE CLEAN 
AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DoLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981) [hereinafter cited as CLEAN COAL). 
3. Id. at 27. 
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tions and complex statutory schemes which in turn included many 
explicitly detailed provisions. One example of such overly explicit 
lawmaking is section 111 of the Clean Air Act, which deals with set-
ting emission standards for new coal-burning power plants.4 The 
EPA was given the monumental task of translating that "inept"5 
statutory directive into practical regulatory policy. Specifically, the 
EP A was directed to establish a standard that, in the original words 
of the statute, "reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable 
through the application of the best system of emission reduction 
which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the 
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated."6 
This language strongly suggests that emission standards can be 
equated with the use of a single technological system; yet it is ques-
tionable whether Congress properly addressed the complex problem 
of air pollution by developing a technology-based approach to the ap-
parent exclusion of management-based approaches. The authors 
maintain that this kind of lawmaking is fundamentally flawed. As 
such, the first mistake occurred when Congress gave statutory 
prominence exclusively to technological means of pollution control in 
new coal-burning power plants. 
Rather than responding with the creative use of its expertise, the 
EP A compounded this failure when it narrowly interpreted the 
"best system"7 of emission reduction as a simple exercise of 
engineering methods in an ecological and economic vacuum. The 
EPA decided that the best system was the wet scrubber - a new and 
quite imperfect technology. Nevertheless, the scrubber was sym-
bolically satisfying to the technological gadget-oriented approach 
because it was a mechanical device "attached to a smokestack, paid 
for directly by the polluter [and which] promised to cleanse the 
smoke produced by the boilers below."8 
Next came the problem of translating this engineering judgment 
into practical regulatory policy. The EPA's "impoverished reading"9 
of the "artless"lo congressional statute led to unenforceable stand-
ards because of the dichotomy between forced scrubbing and the 
promulgated emissions ceiling standard, defined as 1.2 pounds of 
4. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 111(a)(I), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-6(a)(l) (1976). 
5. CLEAN COAL supra note 2, at 13. 
6. Id. at 11. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 15. 
9. Id. at 17. 
10. Id. at 55. 
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S02 per MBTU (millions of tons of BTU's of energy produced). The 
only way the EPA scrubbing requirement could be translated into an 
emission limitation of general applicability would be if all coal con-
tained the same amount of sulfur. Such is not the case; sulfur content 
of coal in the United States varies widely from the generally low-
sulfur coals of the west to some very dirty high-sulfur coals of the 
east. Obviously, if one plant scrubs clean l-lb coal (coal producing lIb 
of S02 per MBTU) at a level of 70 percent and another plant scrubs 
10-lb coal (coal which is 10 times dirtier) at 70 percent efficiency, the 
NSPS ceiling will range from 0.3 to 3.0 lbs of S02 emission per 
MBTU respectively. The latter 3.0 lbs level clearly exceeds the 1.2lb 
emission ceiling.ll The point is that it is not possible to multiply a 
constant, such as 70 percent, by a variable factor, such as sulfur con-
tent, to define a single nationwide numerical ambient air ceiling on 
power plant emissions. Nevertheless, Congress required all new 
plants of the same type to meet the same emission ceiling by 1977 
using the "best system of emission reduction"12 as determined by 
the Administrator. 
As explained by the authors, the infant EPA's unimaginative 
response to the Congress' inept statute resulted in a regulatory 
monstrosity. More importantly, certainly to environmentalists and 
industry alike, is that the installation of forced scrubbing devices 
costs billions of dollars without solving the ecological and human 
health problems generated by coal burners. Indeed, the authors con-
vincingly show how forced scrubbing exacerbates the problem in a 
number of ways. For example, forcing new plants to scrub will ac-
tually result in lengthening the life of the obsolete plants that are the 
big polluters, generating one-half of the sulfur oxides in the United 
States. These old, highly pollutive plants are actually protected from 
the demands of forced scrubbing by grandfather clauses contained in 
various State Implementation Plans (SIPs) developed pursuant to 
the Clean Air Act. The authors point out the perils of neither 
euthanizing nor upgrading such old plants: we can expect a worsen-
ing of the acid precipitation and its concomitant environmental prob-
11. [d. at 19. The numbers are used only to more precisely show the fallacy of equating a 
single emission ceiling with a single designation of scrubber efficiency. 
12. See CLEAN COAL, supra note 2, at 11. 
13. In 1970 Congress set air quality targets to be achieved by 1977. Once apprised of these 
targets it was each state's responsibility to prepare a plan, a State Implementation Plan (SIP) 
that would detail just how the state would attempt to meet those targets. [d. at 9 (discussing 
the highly discretionary, low-visibility process of implementing state SIPs). There is a wide 
range of compliance - for example, many old Midwest plants are allowed to produce four 
times the amount of S02 as allowed by present NSPS standards. 
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lems in the industrial midwest and northeast over the next twenty 
years. 
In short, it appears that we are experiencing the worst aspects of 
both worlds: the retention of New Deal era attitudes in the form of 
protective State Implementation Programs, and the misguided 
technology-forcing approach of the NSPS. Under the SIP scheme of 
regulation industrial polluters are able to play a leading role in the 
protection of older power plants by repeatedly delaying compliance 
with national emission standards, thus subverting the broader goal 
of achieving ambient air quality objectives as promulgated by Con-
gress in the Clean Air Act. By contrast, newer plants are not pro-
tected by SIPs but instead required to meet stringent NSPS stand-
ards via expensive scrubbing technology. As a result, the older 
highly pollutive plants which account for a significant proportion of 
major pollutants are shielded from the requirements imposed upon 
the newer less pollutive plants. Relative to the old plants, newer 
plants are dealt with by virtual strongarm tactics. 
The authors do far more than describe the environmental problem 
and the ineffective administrative response. They show the reader 
how the scrubber became a symbol of salvation to some very strange 
bedfellows. For eastern coal interests the scrubber secured markets 
against the competing cleaner western coal. For environmentalists, 
the scrubber symbolized what many thought would be additional pro-
tection to the pristine beauty of the west. Further, many well-
meaning but uninformed environmentalists believed all coal-
powered plants would be forced to scrub, not just the new ones. To a 
battleworn President Carter, scrubbers meant political support for 
his high-priority energy program because now the United States 
could burn American coal instead of OPEC oil. As described by the 
authors, the result of this unseemly coalition of interests was EPA's 
NSPS decision, thou shalt scrub thy stacks.14 
When reading this story of erroneous perceptions caused by 
limited vision, one cannot help recalling the ancient parable of the 
elephant being felt by the blind men. The one who felt the trunk con-
cluded that the elephant was like a snake, whereas the man who felt 
the hind leg remarked, "It's like a tree!" In the case of our story, the 
metaphorical elephant represents the awesome problem of air pollu-
tion. The range of perceptual differences by the various constituen-
cies viewing the same problem invites a cynical chuckle. In the 
original parable, the blindness of the men is an unexplained given; 
14. See supra note 1. 
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but in our extension of the metaphor, the actors are blinded by a 
preconceived and tenaciously supported concept of the scrubber 
which in turn ludicrously subverts, indeed precludes a more accurate 
perception of the overall pollution pachyderm. Clean Coal/Dirty Air 
shows the reader how the actors became blinded by the scrubber 
method approach. 
The authors present a depressing story of a tug-of-war involving a 
combination of an uninformed Congress;15 the intervention of ex-
ecutive politics into the business of the EP A;16 the politics of 
regional protectionism;17 midnight lawmaking; 18 low-visibility 
politics;1£, and the ambivalence of politicians preparing for national 
elections.20 In short, the scenario is that of a general institutional 
breakdown21 which clearly reveals the history behind the NSPS 
forced scrubbing statute. Further, the study shows us how it is possi-
ble to avoid fruitful debate and hard-headed analysis of such major 
issues for ten years. The technology-forcing approach of scrubbing 
exemplifies the frailties of applying linear solutions to multi-
dimensional problems. It exposes forced scrubbing as a multibillion 
dollar non-solution which, in effect, avoids fundamental ecological, 
economic, and health problems. In the mood of the message from 
Amory Lovins in Soft Energy Paths, at the end of the first half of 
Clean Coal/Dirty Air we are left with the thought: "Scrubbers are 
the answer, but what was the question?"22 
The second half of Clean Coal/Dirty A ir addresses the challenge of 
avoiding a repetition of the scrubbing scenario. The authors view the 
failure to implement sensible policy as a symptom of organizational 
breakdown, and use their case study as a vehicle to suggest a founda-
tion for institutional reform.23 They examine the problem from inter-
related points of view creatively set forth in the final four chapters of 
the book. I found it to be provocative and lively reading. 
First, the authors pursue their interest in comparative pre- and 
post-New Deal institutional design via a simulation. The scrubber 
15. CLEAN COAL, supra note 2, at 28. 
16. Forced scrubbing was a part of Secretary Schlesinger's comprehensive energy plan. See 
id. at 44. See also id. at 86-87 (information about the DOE-EPA interaction). 
17. Id. at 44·48. 
18. Id. at 48-54. 
19. Id. at 38. The entire study is permeated by references to such arcane politics. 
20. Id. at 41. 
21. Id. at 57. 
22. A. B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE (1977)(evoking, in turn, 
the mood of E. F. Schumacher. The title to the first chapter of Lovins' wonderful classic is 
Technology Is the Answer! (But What Was the Question?». 
23. CLEAN COAL, supra note 2, at 57. 
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issue is considered from the viewpoint of an ideal post-New Deal 
agency. The authors try to reproduce the manner in which a knowl-
edgeable EPA bureaucrat might use the expertise of hislher agency 
(expertise defined as the level of the conventional wisdom now cur-
rent in the EPA) to analyze the problem as if she/he were "forced to 
argue in a means-end-mode."24 Significantly, this ideal agency would 
not attempt to resolve the complex scientific and technical questions. 
Instead, the simulation reveals the necessity of comprehensive 
study; the need to more effectively define the problem in light of new 
facts; the need for comparing local to regional problems; the need for 
integrating short-term with long-term strategies; and the need for 
proposing enforceable regulations. Second, the "Thought Experi-
ment"25 simulation seems reasonable, and the authors clearly il-
lustrate what the real EPA in its "single-minded concern with in-
strumental rationality"26 failed to consider, by accurately identifying 
several issues which were avoided by the real EPA. Many of the 
elements revealed by the authors' conscientiously inquiring ideal 
agency are not only valid, but critical for intelligent, adaptive policy 
formulation and implementation. 
Some of the alternative strategies suggested for a more realistic 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act's mandate warrant our attention. 
First, the authors note that scrubbers frequently break down, and 
rarely achieve predicted cleaning efficiency. Further, it is not possi-
ble to inspect and monitor every major emissions source. Presently, 
it is common practice for the polluters to monitor themselves and 
submit their unverified data to the EPA. Therefore, the authors sug-
gest that a valid long-term strategy to ease the chronic enforcement 
problem would be for the agency to intervene at the time when a 
utility plans to build a new plant by requiring the company to assure 
enforcement officials that it will build a "captive" mine or otherwise 
contract for a guaranteed supply of clean coal. If such a mine sup-
plies one or more power plants with clean coal, and if the plants must 
obtain their coal from this known source, the enforcement dilemma 
has indeed been ameliorated at the source - the coal. 
Clean coal may be directly mined, or dirty coal can be made cleaner 
at the mine by washing sulfur pyrites from pulverized coal. A signifi-
cant percentage of the sulfur in coal is so loosely held that the com-
paratively simple and inexpensive process of washing can remove 20 
24. [d. at 60. 
25. [d. at 59. 
26. [d. at 57. 
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to 40 percent of the total sulfur content; yet only an estimated 40 
percent of eastern coal is washed.27 The comparative cost of washing 
to scrubbing becomes even lower when the costs of scrubbing include 
second-order environmental pollution.28 I agree with the authors' 
contention that coal washing should have emerged as a primary 
strategy for pollution abatement. 
8ince one old plant may produce four times the 802 as one new 
plant, a second alternative approach is to encourage the building of 
modern, less pollutive plants. Forced scrubbing is so expensive that 
utilities often decide not to build new plants, thereby lengthening the 
life of the creaky old plants. The authors make the counter-intuitive 
suggestion that, because of this disincentive effect the EPA should 
not insist upon installing scrubbers at the time a plant is built. In-
stead, the plants should be allowed to meet the 1.2 lb ceiling by other 
means such as by washing, and/or burning clean coal, as long as the 
builders of the plant demonstrate that it can accommodate scrubber 
retrofits when necessary. This strategy should make it possible to 
retrofit new, technologically superior, "year-2010 scrubbers into 
1980 plants"29 rather than continuing to use the existing old plants, 
many of which cannot be retrofitted for scrubbers without ripping 
down the entire plant. 
I agree with the authors' decision not to become embroiled in scien-
tific and technical considerations. I also agree with their premise 
that the EPA should have taken a wider spectrum of air pollutants 
into account rather than pursuing a simplistic preoccupation with 
802, Even with these considerations in mind, I sensed an overreac-
tion in their sharp differentiation between the 802 and sulfate prob-
lem. The authors' analysis of the conversion of 802 to sulfate is a bit 
superficial, especially in a book where a central message is for-
mulated as an attack on the technological and regulatory obsession 
with 802 emissions. While it may be folly to pursue 802 while ignor-
ing other pollutants, we must continue to remove 802 from the air 
because, to the best of our knowledge, 802 is the ultimate source of 
our sulfate problem. 
Nevertheless, the authors' points are well taken with respect to 
the EPA's preoccupation with 802 as a surrogate for all the other 
27. Id. at 67. But see id. at 136 n.3, 156 n.30 (indicating that 40% is a highly optimistic 
fIgure and that more likely only 25% of eastern coal is washed). 
28. Thousands of gallons of water and hundreds of tons of limestone are used every day per 
plant in the process of scrubbing. Enormous quantities of secondary pollutants (e.g. caustic 
sludge, salty water) are produced by nonregenerative scrubbing systems. 
29. CLEAN COAL, supra note 2, at 73. 
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sulfur oxides when, even at that time, partial knowledge concerning 
the complexity of the problem was sufficient to render that decision 
essentially unsupportable.30 To be sure, studies completed well 
before the enactment of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act 
showed that ambient concentrations of S02 and sulfates are neither 
equal nor equatable; that the rate of oxidation from S02 to sulfates is 
highly variable and mitigated by several atmospheric factors in-
cluding particulate levels; that several synergistic health effects in-
volving S02, sulfates, ozone, particulates, and high humidity have 
been identified; and that several health studies show a high degree of 
significance between both ambient sulfate and particulate concentra-
tions and human health. This evidence strongly suggests that serious 
health problems are related to some compound or compounds in 
which S02 is at the very least a precursor or catalytic element. Still, 
we lack full knowledge of the formation and effect of such com-
pounds. 
The complexities of environmental cause and effect relationships is 
an old story to environmental scientists. For years antedating Earth 
Day, we have known that nature has insidious ways of accumulating 
and concentrating toxic substances.31 Chemicals released into the 
earth's systems in one place often turn up elsewhere quite unex-
pectedly, and often in a more damaging form. Sulfates are no excep-
tion. Sulfates found in one location may have originated as S02 
several hundreds of miles away. While the authors are quick to point 
out that S02 concentrations have declined in the United States in the 
past twenty years, only in a footnote do they mention that S02 emis-
sions have been dramatically increasing.32 Whatever the specific 
culprit, it is well established that sulfur and nitrogen oxides cause 
health problems and retain their harmful properties as elements of 
acid precipitation. In this context, the authors' quibbling about short 
versus tall smokestacks on the basis of which method more efficient-
ly removes certain pollutants does not present a productive alter-
native strategy. At best it demonstrates how apparently ready "solu-
tions" ultimately fail because they often evade the fundamental 
30. Sawyer, The Sulfur We Breathe, ENVIRONMENT, March, 1978, at 26. 
31. This was poignantly reported to the public in R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962), and has 
subsequently been repeatedly demonstrated by environmental scientists. 
32. CLEAN COAL, supra note 2, at 154 n.16. The point is that tall smokestacks push S02 emis-
sums into the atmosphere, thereby lowering local S02 concentrations. Lower stacks result in 
more local S02 fallout deposited on the ground, but the tall stacks do not avoid the problem -
they make the sulfate problem worse by retaining emissions in the atmosphere where they can 
be oxidized to form sulfates. 
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problem. Similarly the reader might question the efficacy of 
"judicious site selection"SS as a partial solution, especially since site 
selection opportunities are limited by the concentrated industrial 
development in the northeastern airshed. In fairness, the authors do 
appreciate the relationship between sulfates and the acidification of 
northeastern lakes and point out that the fate of the Adirondack high 
lakes cannot be decided locally, or even by New York state alone. 
Clearly, local information should be used to develop regional 
strategies and policies under the umbrella of a comprehensive agen-
cy plan.34 
The authors, Ackerman and Hassler, contend that the EPA should 
have a long-range planning function and be responsive to emerging 
problems such as the complex sulfate/particulate phenomenon. The 
agency should meet the challenge with creative use of expertise to 
develop a regulatory scheme which will not be rendered useless in 
light of subsequently discovered information. The expertise at the 
EPA's disposal should not be used to justify predetermined answers 
or to cloud basic issues. We should expect our agencies to openly 
argue the core questions in order to get at the heart of the matter, 
not avoid it. In addition, the authors see the need for a new institu-
tional framework that would establish the EPA as "an insulated and 
expert pollution control agency concerned with the cost-effective 
pursuit of health-related targets established by the Congress."35 I 
find this ideal a somewhat narrow concept and would include 
ecological considerations as well as those concerning human 
health.36 Although I would argue for broadening the authors' con-
cept of an ideal EPA, I certainly agree that insulating the EPA from 
33. Although I remain unconvinced of the "our" v. "their" approach when the realities of 
long distance transport are so elusive, I am forced to agree with the authors that there are a 
few instances where the dichotomy is valid for policymaking. Eastern problems are different 
from western problems, where smelters produce several times the S02 generated by the 
western power plants which burn low sulfur coal. Here the authors are correct in questioning 
the incremental reductions gained from very expensive full scrubbing. 
34. This topic should be of particular interest to folks from Massachusetts because in 1980, 
our rainfall was the most acidic in the nation. Since many of our lakes are on poorly-buffered 
substrata, the Massachusetts Division of Fish and Wildlife predicts that 40% of our lakes, in-
cluding such pristine resources as the Quabbin Reservoir, will be in the "critical" category in 
the near future and demonstrate severe changes in, or eradication of, fish communities. Water 
Resources Reseach Center Newsletter, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, December, 
1981. 
35. CLEAN COAL, supra note 2, at 118. 
36. For example, the acid rain problem in the northeastern freshwater lakes will probably 
manifest itself as a major ecological disaster long before it becomes a major problem for human 
health, because people do not spawn or filter their water through gills. Clearly, humans should 
take heed of the impact upon animals of ecological problems. 
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direct congressional intervention is of central importance. Their re-
counting of "political" pressures in the NSPS case study makes this 
need all too clear. 
What if the Congress enacts an agency-forcing statute fully 
expecting the EPA to rigorously analyze that legislative policy? At 
the same time, what if the EPA believes Congress has already made 
the policy judgment and therefore, substantially restricts the EPA's 
ability to review such policy? The authors use the classical Alphonse-
Gaston37 analog in which both players drop the ball to describe the 
Congress-EPA interaction wherein a critical policy is adopted (the 
NSPS decision) without undergoing the sustained analysis which 
should accompany sound lawmaking. 
Who should be responsible for carrying out fundamental review of 
an agency's policy? Should it be an ad hoc Regulatory Analysis 
Review Group (RARG), such as the one President Carter ordered in 
1978 to analyze the EPA's proposed NSPS initiative? Those ex-
ecutive office economists certainly showed that the EPA had done 
its job badly. Particularly embarrassing to the EPA must have been 
the ironic finding that it had "failed to illuminate the environmental 
dimensions of the problem in a sophisticated way."3S The RARG's 
comparative success in revealing the EPA's failure seems to argue 
strongly for policy review by persons operating outside the control of 
the operating agency. 
Should the most fundamental reviewing task be intra-agency? This 
reader and the authors would like to think so; in the NSPS case the 
EP A clearly did not. Should the reviewing task be an inter-agency 
one such as one between EP A and DOE thereby running the risk of 
becoming a political football; or should review be left to the judiciary? 
The authors, both lawyers, emphasize that we should not rely on the 
courts to make up for the failures of the administrative process, and 
the court's deferential review of the NSPS in Sierra Club v. Costle, 
for example, appears to lend support to this view.39 Nevertheless, 
37. Id. at 104-05. 
38. Id. at 92-93. 
39. As CLEAN COAL was being written, the NSPS decision was on appeal, Sierra Club v. 
Costle, No. 79-1565 (D.C. Cir., filed June 11, 1979). EPA's NSPS regulations were subse-
quently upheld in April, 1981. The opinion, Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (1981), is very 
lengthy and meticulously prepared. Readers for whom a one-page synopsis will suffice should 
consult [May] ENVT'L. L. REP. DIGEST (ENVT'L. L. INST.) at 20455. The court used the arbitrary 
and capricious standard, and found that the EPA decision was based upon substantial 
evidence. On one hand, the authors would applaud the court not second-guessing the agency's 
decision. See CLEAN COAL, supra note 2, at 6. On the other hand, the authors contend that a 
full inquiry of the NSPS decision would "demand a strong remand to the administrator." Id. at 
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the authors do present a chapter in which they discuss the proper 
scope of judicial review concerning the EPA decision. What was 
formerly described as a desirable mode of conduct for the EPA - a 
fundamental function which is open, revealing and informing - is 
consistent with what the authors eventually define as an appropriate 
role for courts when called upon to evaluate agency performance. 
The function of the courts should not be primarily to second-guess 
agency decisions. To assume primary responsibility for the develop-
ment of substantive policy under the Clean Air Act would obviously 
"presume a policymaking competence that outstrips judicial 
capacities."40 Rather, the authors support a more classical concept 
of judicial review serving the function of requiring the fullest possi-
ble agency investigations into competing plausible policy options, 
and to "delicately calibrate Congress-agency relationships to pre-
vent mindless decisionmaking."41 Therefore, the authors propose 
that in reviewing agency decisions the judiciary employ the three 
principles of full inquiry, textual priority, and coordination to help 
assure the appropriate interpretation and implementation of agency-
forcing statutes. 
If agency-forcing statutes were read in the light of the principle of 
full inquiry, the fullest possible agency investigation into competing 
policy approaches would be required.42 In the case of the scrubbing 
controversy, the EPA should have read section 111 as an agenda-
forcing provision rather than as a constricting form of technological 
solution-forcing. The authors discuss several benefits to be derived 
from engaging in full debate concerning the fundamental intent of 
the text of the law, which in this case is to clean the air. Textual 
priority is especially critical in the interpretation of the environmen-
tal legislation enacted in the early seventies because these statutes, 
for all their apparent complexity, really consist of a few basic prin-
ciples. Finally, application of the principle of coordination, requiring 
inter-agency coordination in an attempt to avoid conflicts with the 
goals of other agencies, is particularly appropriate in interpreting 
environmental statutes. The courts should search for a • ·plausible 
statutory interpretation that renders a court confrontation between 
115. The problem of relating the specifics of the appeal to the philosophical models proposed by 
the authors makes it very Jifficult for this reader to interpret the extent to which the authors 
would approve or disapprove of this judicial ruling. The major premise of CLEAN COAL remains 
valid no matter what the court's decision. 
40. Id. at 104. 
41. Id. at 115. 
42. Id. at 105. 
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agencies unnecessary."43 When applied to the scrubbing controver-
sy, application of these three principles would require a strong re-
mand to the EPA Administrator in order to force that agency to "do 
its job" - presumably a much better job than was done in the case of 
scrubbers. I found this chapter concerning the role of the courts to 
be enlightening. It spoke to the philosophical foundations of the 
judicial review process in clear, layperson terms. 
The authors contend that where the Act went wrong was not in its 
basic diagnosis but in the particular cure it prescribed.44 "The Act's 
1970 exercise in means-forcing set the stage in 1977 for the effort by 
the dirty coal-clean air coalition to exploit the technical in-
competence of Congress to advance ends that are peripheral to the 
main goals of environmental law."45 Thus, the authors call for a 
reevaluation and subsequent revision of these early primitive efforts 
in agency forcing in favor of an agency-enabling approach. They 
thoughtfully provide philosophical guidelines for understanding and 
developing an ends-oriented agency-forcing concept, the workable 
form of which has not yet been designed. Via this approach, Con-
gress would require EPA to aggressively and democratically define 
clear and operational goals, and would challenge the agency to select 
a course of action to effectively reach those ends. This approach 
avoids the problem of requiring Congress to engage in making 
technical judgments beyond its capacity. It generates a process for 
optimizing the congressional and agency decisionmaking perform-
ance in an expansive and informational mode which would render the 
vague formulaic "solutions" of New Deal-type legislation a thing of 
the past. 
In conclusion, Clean Coal/Dirty Air is an excellent case study.46 
The central issue and controversy are succinctly stated up front - in 
this case, in the subtitle, How the Clean Air Act Became a 
Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and 
What Should Be Done About It. The causes of the problem are com-
prehensively yet clearly defined. The study is truly interdisciplinary 
in that numerous perspectives are considered; data and information 
are presented from each perspective, with interfaces between and 
43. [d. at 110. 
44. [d. at 122. 
45. [d. at 123. 
46. Characteristics of a good case study are described by the reviewer in an unpublished 
manuscript derived from 10 years of experience in teaching a college-level case studies course. 
See Lockwood, How and Why to Use Case Studies (1980) (unpubl. manuscript available from 
author). 
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among the perspectives identified and analyzed by the authors. The 
complexity of the problem is, therefore, clearly and thoroughly 
demonstrated. Even with this complexity the authors draw out their 
own point of view by artful use of clear, nontechnical, descriptive 
prose. The study is also thoroughly referenced. The analysis raises 
new questions, proposes alternatives and instructs the reader to 
thoughtfully approach similar issues. As such, the study is both 
analytic and forward-looking. It comes to a conclusion as a self-
contained study while showing the reader that it is not merely an 
aberration in history, but that it has salient features which can and 
should be applied to other situations. Hats off to the authors! 
They've made an outstanding contribution to the literature of en-
vironmental affairs. 
Clean Coal/Dirty Air should enjoy a wide readership. It is for 
those with more than a casual interest in environmental issues. 
Though not a technical book, it is far from breezy reading. It is a 
scholarly work that intends to teach. It is a vivid reminder that the 
environmental crisis is a crisis of the human spirit for which the 
ultimate solution is not purely technical. The primary contribution of 
the study is to reinforce the idea and insight that there are no simple 
linear solutions to multi-dimensional problems. It's a long, long road 
from the Earth Day perceptions of environmental desiderata to ham-
mering out enforceable and adaptive environmental policymaking. 
In that light, there is much work to be done, and the authors offer us 
some excellent guidelines for doing better. 
